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The Governance of Close Corporations and Partnerships:
US and European Perspectives
Joseph McCahery, Theo Raaijmakers
and Erik P.M. Vermeulen (eds)
(Oxford University Press: Oxford &
New York, 2004)
Peer Zumbansen*

“Although large public corporations are certainly the most visible manifestations of the corporate form, they are
not the most common”.1 This observation could serve as the starting point for
the inquiries that concern the authors
contributing to this volume. In the context of the much debated and criticized
model of the publicly traded corporation,2 the contributors to The Governance of Close Corporations and Partnerships explore the regulatory and policy challenges of the small and middlesized enterprises (SMEs), closed (or
close) corporations, limited liability
companies (LLC) and limited liability
partnerships (LLP). Based on an international conference in 2001, their papers
bring together the latest legal and economic assessments of these forms of
business association.
The volume provides a welcome
addition to international scholarship in
this field of company law. The book’s
editors, Joseph McCahery, Theo Raaijmakers, and Erik Vermeulen, are leading authorities on corporate law in
*
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Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
C. Nicholls, Corporate Law (_, 2005). 91.
See only the successful launch of Joel
Bakan’s The Corporation 2004), first published as a book, subsequently turned into a
film.

Europe and the United States (US). The
void they fill may be illustrated by a cursory example from some recent legal
literature: “There is a distinction between a private and a public company. A
public company must have a minimum
issued share capital … A public company may, but a private company may
not, offer its shares for sale to the public”.3 Such a pithy observation hardly
captures the complexity of private companies in today’s dynamic corporate environment.4 As the changing economic
realities of closely held corporations
continue to challenge the traditional legal categorization of corporate forms,
only a comprehensive assessment of
their legal and economic milieu can provide an adequate picture of the close
corporation. This volume succeeds in
introducing the key issues raised by the
law of close corporations and partnerships, while exploring the subject-matter
from a variety of theoretical angles.
The book is well-structured and
easy to navigate. It begins with an excellent introduction by Joseph McCahery,
followed by 15 chapters grouped into
four themes.
Part I of the book, dealing with
the first theme, explores the “Theory of
Partnership Law and Close Corporations”. It commences with the republication of Henry Hansmann’s and Reinier
Kraakman’s seminal article, “The Essential Role of Organizational Law”.5 Other
important chapters in this section include
“An Economic Analysis of Shared Prop3
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J. Lowry and L. Watson, Company Law
(Reed Elsevier 2001), 1.16.
See only P. DiMaggio, ‘Introduction: Making Sense of the Contemporary Firm and
Prefiguring the Future’, in The Twenty-First
Century Firm (P. DiMaggio ed., Princeton
University Press 2004), 3-30.
Originally published in (2000) 110 Yale L.J.
387.

erty in Partnership and Close Corporations Law”6 (John Armour and Michael
J. Whincop), “Waiting for the Omelet to
Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority
Oppression in Close Corporations”7 (Ed
Rock and Michael Wachter), and
“Bracketed Flexibility: Standards for
Performance Level the Playing Field”8
(Claire Moore Dickerson).
Of the other three parts, the second addresses the “Evolution of Partnerships and Closely Held Partnerships”,
with contributions from Larry Ribstein,9
J. William Callison,10 and the editors
McCahery and Vermeulen.11 The third
section offers a distinctive comparative
perspective, addressing “Legislative Reform Initiatives in the United Kingdom
and the United States”. It includes chapters by Deborah DeMott,12 Judith
Freedman,13 Geoffrey Morse,14 Allan
Walker Vestal,15 and Donald Weidner.16
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Previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 983, as part of the Symposium
on “Unincorporated Business Entities”.
Originally published in (1999) 24 J. Corporation Law 913.
Previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 1001.
“The Evolving Partnership”, previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 819.
“Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and
the Limited Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded”, previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 951.
“The Evolution of Closely Held Business
Forms in Europe”, previously published in
(2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 855.
“Transatlantic Perspectives on Partnership
Law: Risk and Instability”, previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 879.
“Limited Liability Partnerships in the United
Kingdom: Do They Have a Role for Small
Firms?”, previously published in (2001) 26
J. Corporation Law 897 (with V. Finch).
“Limited Liability Partnerships and Partnership Law Reform in the United Kingdom”.
“Drawing Near the Fastness? The Failed US
Experiment in Unincorporated Business En-

The fourth part and theme of the volume
concerns “The European Private Company and Partnership Reform in the
European Union”. It features chapters by
Robert Drury,17 Theo Raaijmakers,18 and
Peter Essers and Gerard Meussen.19 The
book closes with the text of the European Private Company Draft Regulation.20
For some time, the study of the
governance of private companies21
seemed a quiet backwater of legal research and policy reform. The noisy
calls for corporate governance reform in
the aftermath of financial scandals such
as Enron, Worldcom and Tyco22 further
drew policy-makers’ and scholars’ attention away from the regulation of SMEs
and its variants. The international debate
over convergence or divergence of corporate governance regimes has been
driven primarily by the integration of
global financial markets and subsequent
pressures on rules of corporate financial
transparency and control. Close corporations remained – for a long time – un-
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tity Reform”, previously published in (2001)
26 J. Corporation Law 1019.
“Pitfalls in Partnership Law Reform: Some
US Experience”, previously published in
(2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 1031.
“Private Companies in Europe and the
European Private Company”.
“The Reform Agenda for Partnerships and
Closely Held Companies in the Netherlands
and the European Union”.
“Taxation of Partnerships/Hybrid Entities”.
See further S. Braun, “The European Private
Company: A Supranational Company for
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises?”
(2004) 5 German L. J. 1393.
For the historical background of the distinction between the public and the private
company, see Nicholls, note 1, 92-97.
See the excellent account by W.W. Bratton,
“Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder
Value”, (2002) 76 Tulane L. Rev. 1275.

touched by this discussion and legislative reform.23
Recently, themes such as minimum capital requirements, disclosure
rules and minority shareholder rights
have in various ways preoccupied national regulators and reformers in the US
and European Union (EU) member
states.24 Those developments are richly
documented and analyzed in this volume. The discussion in Europe was facilitated by several seminal decisions of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
These rulings seriously undermine the
so-called ‘Real-Seat theory’ (i.e., the applicable law is defined by the place of
the company's central administration),
which had for many years thwarted any
meaningful discussion of the merits (and
dangers) of regulatory competition in
Europe.25 National company law regimes governed the incorporationas well
as the size and formation of the firm’s
minimum’s capital requirements.26 With
23
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G. Bachmann, Grundtendenzen der Reform
geschlossener Gesellschaften in Europa, 30
Zeitschrift
für
Unternehmensund
Gesellschaftsrecht (_ 2001), 351 at 351.
See the chapters in this volume by Raaijmakers, Vestal, Weidner and Callison,
Freedman, Morse, and McCahery and Vermeulen. The latter, in “The Evolution of
Closely Held Business Forms in Europe”
(previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law. 855), comment: “While scholars
have debated the advantages of private company statutes for more than a decade, the
discussion of competition-based lawmaking
for limited liability companies in Europe
presents a new departure”.
See already D. Charny, “Competition
among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Rules: An American Perspective on
the ‘Race to the Bottom’ in the European
Communities” (1991) 32 Harvard Inter’l
L. J. 423.
See O. Kahn-Freund, “Some Reflections
on Company Law Reform” (1944) 7
Modern L. Rev. 54 at 57: “at the present
moment, it is almost unbelievably easy

the Real-Seat theory preventing legal
recognition of firms incorporated in
other member states, companies in the
EU effectively did not enjoy freedom of
movement. Therefore, one could not
speak about a market for corporate charters – such as had long been the case in
the US.
Since the ECJ rendered its rulings in Centros (1999), Überseering
(2002) and Inspire Art (2003),27 a new
climate for regulatory reform has
emerged in the EU. But numerous regulatory and policy barriers remain. In
Germany, for instance, a plethora of rescue attempts were made in the wake of
Centros to maintain the hegemony of
German company law over foreign corporations operating in Germany.28 The
pressure in Germany to adapt the new
legal situation was particularly high.29 It
is against this background, that the debate over regulatory competition and
freedom of choice in EU company law30
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and even more unbelievably cheap to
form a corporation in this country.”
See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. For analysis, see H.C.
Kersting & C.P. Schindler, “The ECJ's Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003
and its Effects on Practice” (2003) 4 German L. J. 1277.
See only H. Halbhuber, “National Doctrinal Structures and European Company
Law” (2001) 38 Common Market L. Rev.
1385.
The latter might be documented by the
ongoing and recently increased attempts
to reform the minimum capital requirements of the German Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH – Limited
Liability Company); see hereto P.C.
Leyens, “Company Law in Germany –
Recent Developments and Future Developments” (2005) 6 German L. J. 1407 at
1409.
S. Deakin, “Regulatory Competition versus Reflexive Harmonisation in European
Company Law”, in Regulatory Competi-

is acquiring a more prominent place
among EU company law scholars and
policy-makers.31 This development also
highlights the particular regulatory challenges that follow from the type of corporation forms that prevail.

In his introduction, McCahery
discusses the current challenges faced by
reformers on the corporate law applicable to SMEs. His overview begins with
the recognition that a single type of limited liability corporation cannot meet the
specific demands that follow from businesses’ commercial operations in different markets. The private company, the
close, or closely held corporation – in
contrast to the large, publicly held corporation – is evolving into different
forms of limited liability companies
(LLC) and limited liability partnerships
(LLP). But while legislative reform has
greatly improved the range of organizational flexibility, the need for an adequate regulatory framework of SMEs
has increased. It seems that with every
step towards a further reduction of the
corporate owner’s personal liability, the
fundamental question resurfaces of how
to effectively guarantee the protection of
minority shareholders and creditors.
Concurrently, reformers must determine
the appropriate balance between organizational freedom and regulatory protec-

31

tion and Economic Integration. Comparative Perspectives (D.C. Esty and D.
Geradin eds, Oxford University Press
2001) 190.
To assess the dramatic changes to the
early beginnings, see only C. Schmitthoff,
“The Future of the European Company
Law Scene”, in The Harmonisation of
European Company Law (C. Schmitthoff
ed, London 1973) 3, highlighting the crucial importance of harmonized company
laws for the European market.

tionism. McCahery (later jointly with
Vermeulen in the volume) rightly points
to the traditional reluctance of many national lawmakers to improve their company laws. The tension between the Anglo-Saxon enabling approach to corporate governance, and the continental
European emphasis on mandatory company law rules,32 unfolds just as powerfully in the closely held corporation as it
does with the large, public corporation.
The volume is also distinctive for
the reconsideration some contributors
give to the long-standing nexus-ofcontracts theory of the firm.33 They do
so in light of the dynamics between the
emergence of the unincorporated firm
with limited liability, on the one hand,
and private equity investors’ desire for
high standards of corporate governance,
on the other. It is this tension that defines the SME compared to the larger,
public corporation, where the traditional
lines of conflict run between the dispersed shareholders (or, increasingly institutional investors) and the company’s
management.
Hansmann and Kraakman in their
chapter explore this tension by revealing
the Janus-faced nature of limited liability. They distinguish between two forms
of corporate asset partitioning to meet
creditors’ claims. The first form, “af32

33

J.W. Cioffi, Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the
United States and Germany, 1 CLPE Research Paper Series No. 01 (September
2005), 7-11.
The original theory was developed by
M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, “Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,
(1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305; and A.A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization”, (1972) 62 American Econ. Rev.
777.

firmative asset partitioning”, prioritizes
the claims of creditors against assets
held by the company with whom the
firm contracts in its own name. And only
secondarily, if ever, will the claims of
personal or business creditors of the
firm’s owners be met. Thus, affirmative
asset partitioning creates a distinct fund
for the firm’s creditors, thereby giving
them a prior claim on the firm’s assets
before the owners’ personal creditors
can realize their claims. In contrast, “defensive asset partitioning” shields the
firm’s owners’ assets from creditors’
claims against the firm. In this form,
limited liability shields investors’ personal assets. In both cases, limited liability distinguishes between the firm’s and
the owners’ assets, but the perspective
differs in each case. While the latter focuses on the traditional model of limited
liability (limiting the investors’ risk
while augmenting the creditors’ risk),
the former strengthens the position of the
firm’s creditors.
While Hansmann’s and Kraakman’s central contention is that property
law eventually renders a better understanding of the limited liability firm than
contract law,34 their distinction between
defensive and affirmative asset partitioning in fact illustrates much more. From
the perspective of creditors’ rights on the
firm, not only does the specific nature of
the business entity become apparent, but
also the nature and scope of the norms
governing this entity.
Regulatory (jurisdictional) competition versus state intervention is a further important concern of many contributors in this volume. Ribstein underlines the relevance of regulatory competition that many perceive as having been
notably strengthened through the ECJ’s
Centros decision. He highlights the ex34

Hansmann and Kraakman, note _, 26

ample setting role of the US in allowing
“‘horizontal’ jurisdictional competition
to facilitate market-testing, variety, and
evolution of laws”. He elaborates that:
“the best path for Europe is to facilitate
competition regarding business association laws rather than eliminating competition through ‘harmonization’”.35 But
Ribstein does not share the enthusiasm
about the Centros case law in Europe,
because he fears that “significant differences” continue to remain between the
US and the EU. He is not convinced that
Centros fully set aside the Real Seat
doctrine: “inherent legal, cultural, language, historical, and other differences
among European countries may play a
greater role in constraining firms’ ability
to choose from among different jurisdictions”.36 Europe’s ways, then, may continue to follow different paths from those
of the US. While Ribstein postulates that
“[m]arkets, and not government, have
the wisdom to guide firms in an uncertain world”,37 in his view the EU is some
way off from the type of regulatory
competition pervasive in the US.
Indeed, not everyone has
strongly supported regulatory competition.38 While the generous availability of
limited liability to small firms and partnerships – e.g. the introduction of the
LLP in the United Kingdom (UK)39 and
35
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“The Evolving Partnership (previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law.
819), 185.
Ibid, 185-6.
Ibid, 187.
The debate has been going for a long time.
For its beginnings in company law, see W.
Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware” (1974) 83 Yale L.
J. 663; R. Winter, “State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation” (1977) 6 J. Leg. Stud. 251.
See the contributions from Freedman,
Morse, and McCahery & Vermeulen, in this
volume.

the enactment of LLC statutes by US
state legislatures40 – can provide investors with a flexible investment vehicle
with attractive financial incentives, it has
its drawbacks.41 Other policy instruments must rectify the loss of security
and monitoring leverage over the firm
engendered by limited liability. Judith
Freedman and Geoffrey Morse review
this problem with regard to the UK,
while J. William Callison critiques the
supposedly firm theoretical basis for favoring limited liability corporations.
Joseph McCahery and Erik Vermeulen in their chapter recognize the
obstacles in the EU for regulatory competition. But while their declared goal is
“to extend the debate over regulatory
competition to closely held organization
forms”,42 they argue that this alone will
not suffice. “Solving the problems of
European company law will take more
than the introduction of competition between member states”.43 The authors explain that though the recent blows to the
EU’s Real Seat doctrine may create “incentives for governments to create better
business organization vehicles”, national
company laws retain significant differences concerning minimum capital requirements and public disclosure rules.44
Striking differences among company law
regimes throughout the EU continue to
hinder attempts to move the EU Company Law agenda forward.45 And yet,

the momentum for change is in place,
induced by stock corporation and securities law reforms among other pressures.46 Demands among foreign institutional investors and other stakeholders
are pushing all EU states inexorably towards better disclosure rules and corporate financial transparency.47
Yet, McCahery and Vermeulen,
after reviewing regulatory changes in the
UK, France and Germany, observe that
“the linkage of public corporation law to
closely held corporations is likely to be
inefficient”.48 This leads not only back
to the debate about the economic efficiency of extending limited liability to
close corporations,49 but it also touches
on the scope and shortcomings of the
draft European Private Company (EPC)
prepared by an international group of
business leaders and legal experts.
McCahery’s and Vermeulen’s verdict is
as short as it is decisive: offering insufficient default rules that can be readily
applied and too few incentives for corporate reorganization, the EPC is imbued
with “the EC company law inertia”.50
However, even an incomplete regulatory
competition might provide some incentives for national legislators to learn

46
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44
45

See the contributions from Ribstein, Callison, Vestal and Weidner in this volume.
Callison, note _ , 254 explains: “It has been
widely noted that corporate law limited liability provisions create incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting corporations and their owners to avoid the full costs
of their activities”.
McCahery and Vermeulen, note _, 193.
Ibid.
Ibid, 194.
P. Zumbansen, “European Corporate Law
and National Divergences: The Case of
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Takeover Law”, (2004) 3 Wash. U. Glob.
Stud. L. Rev. 867; J. Wouters, “European
Company Law: Quo Vadis?” (2000) 37
Common Market Law Review 257.
See, e.g., M. Rhodes and B. van Apeldoorn,
“Capital Unbound? The Transformation of
European Corporate Governance”, in Theories of Corporate Governance. The Philosophical Origins of Corporate Governance (T.
Clarke, ed. Routledge, 2004), 243.
J.W. Cioffi, “Restructuring ‘Germany Inc’:
The Politics of Corporate Governance Reform in Germany and the European Union”
(2002) 24 Law & Policy 355.
McCahery and Vermeulen, note _, 206.
See Hansmann and Kraakman, Wachter and
Rock, and Ribstein in this volume
McCahery and Vermeulen, note _, 208.

from their neighbors. With their eyes
close to the ground, McCahery and
Vermeulen believe that “as Europe enters the competitive law making environment, lawmakers will mainly focus
on the needs of business firms that are
most likely to engage in forum shopping”.51 The numerous incorporations of
“German” firms under the rules of Britain’s LLC must thus be seen in direct
correlation with the increased attention
given in Berlin to reforming the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung. The
authors’ note that the work of the quasiprivate corporate governance commission has brought about the largest
changes in German (public) corporation
law since the last major reform.52
Finally, this volume is significant
for its contributions to the debates about
the supposed efficiency and democracy
of the limited liability corporation. Callison, following McCahery’s and Vermeulen’s chapter on EU developments,
traces the dramatic extension of limited
liability privileges to partnerships in the
wake of the rise in importance of limited
liability companies in the US.53 Callison
identifies the origin of this development
as the decoupling of partnership tax classification from personal liability,
achieved when the US Internal Revenue
Service granted limited liability companies favorable partnership taxation.
Thereafter, most states in the US enacted
limited liability partnership (LLP) stat51
52
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Ibid, 222.
See T. Baums, “Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making
Process of a Very New Nature”, interviewed
by Peer Zumbansen for (2001) 12 German
L. J. 2.
See especially W.W. Bratton and J. McCahery, “An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the
Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of
the Firm and Regulatory Competition”
(1997) 54 Wash. & Lee L. Review 629.

utes. Callison revisits the lobbying and
legislative processes behind the reforms,
and is critical of the heavy influence of
business lawyers at the expense of other
voices that would have illuminated better some of the potential costs of extending limited liability.54 He is also critical
of much of the law and economics theory and its claims about the efficiency
enhancing effects of limited liability on
smaller companies.55 Callison believes
that that theory was built around the experiences of large, publicly traded companies and was not originally intended to
apply to SMEs.
Callison’s critique goes even further to challenge the nexus-of-contracts
theory. Drawing on theory ranging from
communitarian social theory to critical
legal scholarship, Callison questions the
application of the individualistic, nexus
of contracts doctrine to the closed corporation and the partnership, now equipped
with limited liability.56 He believes that
the nexus-of-contracts theory wrongly
assumes people to be rational and egooriented actors without social ties or
moral obligations. Consequently, the
theory inappropriately separates the corporation and its shareholders from their
broader socio-economic and cultural environment. Limited liability in this context reverses the traditional corporate
law understanding, “in which the partnership is viewed as acting on the partners’ behalf of and under their control
and in which partners have unlimited
liability”.57
Callison’s chapter achieves the
rare result of presenting us with no sim54
55
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Callison, note _, 253.
See, above all, F. Easterbrook and D.
Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (__, 1991).
Ibid, 266.
Callison, note _, 262.

ple answers but instead highlights the
ambiguities inherent to most arguments
in the debate: “theoretical bases for extending limited liability protection to
unincorporated business organizations
are uncertain and indeterminate.58 Arguments can “be made for efficiency and
for inefficiency, for autonomy and for
community, for democracy and for limits
on equal treatment”.59 This captures well
the lessons to be learned from this rich
volume.
Overall, The Governance of Close
Corporations and Partnerships will likely
become a key reference for future research into the structure and the regulatory challenges of the close corporations.
While many of the chapters were already
published, the editors have assembled,
edited and added to the existing literature to produce a book that both seasoned scholars and students of company
law will surely find very useful. Further,
the book should appeal not only to company lawyers in the EU and US, but also
to people in other jurisdictions including
Canada where similar regulatory challenges are emerging.

58

59

Ibid, 268; see likewise McCahery and Vermeulen in this volume, at 217: “Because
there is little empirical evidence to support
either the efficiency or inefficiency of limited liability for closely held firms, this is a
very complex question to which there is no
straightforward answer” (with reference to
Bratton and McCahery. note _).
Callison, note _, 268.

